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Abstract 
Diverse measures are used as proxies for judicial ability, ranging from the college and 
law school a judge attended to the rate at which her decisions are cited by other judges.  
Yet there has been little serious examination of which of these ability measures is better 
or worse at predicting the quality of judicial performance—including the management 
and disposition of cases.  In this article, we attempt to evaluate these measures of ability 
by examining a rich group of performance indicators.  Our innovation is to derive 
performance measures from judicial decisions other than case outcomes (which are 
inherently difficult to evaluate): the decisions to preside over a securities class action, to 
reject a motion for lead plaintiff, to dismiss the complaint with prejudice, and to reject a 
request for fees.  In each case, an affirmative decision requires more work from the judge, 
and thus may be an indicator that the judge works hard and, all else equal, performs well.  
Using a database of securities class action cases, we find that judges who publish 
frequently and are highly cited are more likely to dismiss with prejudice but no more 
likely to make the hard choice in the other cases.  Other proxies for judicial ability 
(attended top law school, judicial experience, earlier position as judge, prior private 
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A large literature has established that judges are sometimes influenced by their 
ideological preferences, but leaves unanswered many questions about judicial 
decisionmaking.   One unanswered question concerns the relationship between the ability 
of judges and their output.  Everyone would agree that judges with greater ability should 
produce better output—more decisions, higher-quality decisions, better opinions that 
describe their reasoning.  But what are the best indicators of judicial ability? This 
question has received little attention.  Yet it is important.  When district judges are 
nominated to the appellate bench, for example, their performance as trial judges provides 
a basis for evaluating them.  Nevertheless, there is rarely a serious inquiry into what 
objectively measureable aspects of the relative performances of the lower court judges or 
their prior backgrounds should be considered in determining the best candidates for 
promotion. 
By contrast, the primary ratings of nominees that are employed in the context of 
the judicial appointments, the subjective ratings produced by the American Bar 
Association, have been found to have but a limited relationship to future judicial 
performance, measured in terms of reversals and citations (Barondes 2009; Landes et al. 
1998, at 325).  These ratings have also been criticized by conservatives who believe that 
they are politically biased (Vining et al. 2009, discuss the debate and the empirical 
evidence).  Similarly, take some of the most familiar indicators of quality that the press 
discusses any time there is a judicial candidate who has been nominated for a higher 
office; law school attended, prior judicial experience, prior practice experience.  It is 
plausible that each of these may be an indicator of future judicial performance, but there 
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is also reason to be skeptical of the degree to which these measures will translate into 
future judicial performance.  Law school, for example, for most judicial candidates (who 
are usually in their late 40s or early 50s) reflects experiences from at least two decades in 
their past.      
Broadly speaking, our hypothesis is that more able judges produce superior 
judicial output.  This hypothesis might seem too obvious to be worth proving, but in fact 
raises important and interesting issues.  The first is the methodological challenge of 
finding measures for judicial ability—which judges are “better” than other judges?  We 
catalog three categories of judicial ability: past judicial performance; native or 
experiential ability; and depreciating ability.  
Past Performance: Recent academic work on judicial behavior, including ours, 
has extensively used measures of past performance of judges as a measure of judicial 
ability (e.g., Choi & Gulati 2004; Cross & Lindquist 2009).  The most commonly used 
measures of past judicial performance are positive citations to a judge’s opinions (which 
purports to measure opinion quality), the judge’s rate of affirmances by a higher court 
(which might measure either quality or an ability to anticipate the preferences of the 
higher court), and productivity or propensity to exert effort (as measured by the number 
of published opinions per district court filing). 
Native Talent and Experience: A casual examination of press accounts of the 
qualifications of lower court judges seeking elevation reveals that other measures – ones 
that might be characterized as indicators of native talent and experience – are discussed 
far more often.  These are measures such as general judicial experience (number of years 
on the job as a federal district judge and whether the district judge served as a judge in 
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another court prior to elevation to the federal bench) and specialized judicial experience  
(whether one has worked on business matters in private practice prior to becoming a 
judge and prior judicial experience in the business law area, for example). Similarly, 
those who attended the best law schools are generally assumed to have the most native 
talent.   
Depreciating Ability:  Judicial ability may increase with age (because of 
experience) or decline with age (because of cognitive impairment).  Given that judges 
will vary widely in terms of the impact of age on them, as a function of their individual 
characteristics, one way to study the impact of aging is to examine the performance of 
judges who choose to take senior status.  The choice to take senior status, we assume, is 
also an indication that the judge herself has determined that she is no longer able to take 
on a full load of work.      
Our three categories of judicial ability give us a total of nine measures of judicial 
ability—past performance (citations, affirmances, and publications), prior experience 
(prior experience as a judge before joining the federal bench, experience as a federal 
district judge, prior private practice experience, the business caseload of the judge), 
native talent (whether the judge attended a top law school), and depreciating ability 
(senior status).  In discussions of judges and their qualifications, these various measures 
are often discussed.  But no one knows whether these measures predict judicial 
performance.  In this article, we attempt to get some traction on that question. 
Our basic hypothesis that high-ability judges produce superior judicial output is 
central to the design of the judicial system.  In theory, only the law and the facts of a 
specific case should determine judicial outcomes.  If judicial characteristics matter, one 
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can ask how the judicial system should be structured to minimize the negative impact of 
such characteristics.  Our findings provide insight into the relative value of having 
generalist judges deciding complex, subject-matter specific legal issues, particularly 
relating to securities class actions.  If, for example, judges with specific business-law 
related ability produce better judicial output, then our findings support the argument that 
the federal judiciary may benefit from having more specialist judges. 
Our dataset consists of decisions of trial judges on motions in securities class 
actions for cases initially filed between 2003 to mid-2007.  The dataset of cases includes 
not just case outcomes, the typical measure used to evaluate judicial performance, but 
also judges’ decisions on various motions, including motions to dismiss, to approve 
settlements, and to approve attorneys’ fees. 
We focus on securities class actions for a number of reasons.  They are typically 
characterized by two-sided agency problems (Choi 2003).  That is, the real parties whose 
interests are at stake, the shareholders, frequently have little control over the litigation.  
Instead, the agents on one side, the corporate executives whose actions are being 
challenged, have an incentive to bury any problems and settle using the company’s funds.  
The agents on the other side, the plaintiffs’ lawyers, have an incentive to focus on 
obtaining the highest fees with as little effort as possible.  The end result is that many of 
these cases result in high payouts for the plaintiff’s lawyers, low penalties for the 
misbehaving executives, and high costs to the shareholders (Romano 1991; Bai, Cox & 
Thomas 2010; Choi 2003, surveys the literature).   
For our purposes, what is important here is that there is a central role for the judge 
in protecting the interests of the class of investors (Miller 2003).  The judge, who has to 
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approve of any settlement that the executives and the plaintiffs’ lawyers make, has the 
power to reject the settlement and demand that greater attention be paid to the interests of 
investors.  However, the incentives of the judge are not necessarily to act in such a 
fashion.  Demanding that the parties redo the settlement will require effort from the 
judge, since she will have to give reasons and later assess the revised settlements.  There 
is also the theoretical risk of a time-consuming trial (although the risk is small, the costs 
of a trial in terms of a busy judge’s time and effort would be high).  Given that typically 
both plaintiffs and defendants will support the settlement, the judge who wishes to 
minimize work has an incentive to approve quickly whatever settlement is suggested (as 
well as any attorney fees for the plaintiffs’ attorneys).  This setting is useful for our 
inquiry because it allows us to look at the behavior of judges in approving these 
settlements as well as other pre-trial motions and draw conclusions as to whether they 
exerted effort to protect the interests of the absent parties or deferred to the interests of 
the lawyers controlling the litigation. 
We also examine securities class actions because the law on such actions, largely 
a function of the 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”) was still 
relatively new and evolving during the period that we examine (cases decided from 2003 
to mid-2007).1  That means that lawyers would not have as yet been able to collect 
enough information about how individual judges would behave so as to be able to fully 
adjust their litigation strategies to the likely behavior of the judges in these cases.   
                                                 
1 The Supreme Court, for example, has issued a number of opinions interpreting important aspects of the 
PSRLA over the 2000s, including Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148 (2008); 
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007); and Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 
U.S. 336 (2005). 
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Overall, we have four measures of performance in securities cases, where we can 
say that if a judge takes action X, it constitutes better performance than taking alternative 
action Y.  These measures of performance are: accepting or rejecting a securities case; 
approving or rejecting the lead plaintiff’s selection of lead counsel; granting a motion to 
dismiss with prejudice; and acceptance or rejection of attorneys’ fees requests.  We 
explain these measures in the next section.  Our goal is to examine how our nine 
measures of ability map onto the five measures of performance. 
We survey related literature in Section 2 and set forth our hypotheses relating 
effort and expertise to judicial quality in securities class actions in Section 3.  Section 4 




The literature on the relationship between judicial ability and judicial output is 
sparse.  Landes, Lessig and Solimine (1998) find that federal appeals court judges from 
elite schools and those with high honors produce more cited opinions (a proxy for 
quality).  Christensen and Szmer (2009) find that more experienced federal appellate 
judges are slower at deciding cases (they attribute it to “burn-out”), and that graduates of 
elite law schools decide cases more quickly.2  Bhattacharya & Smyth (2001), using data 
on invocations (a type of citation where the judge is invoked by name), find that younger 
and more conservative judges tend to be more influential.  R. Posner (1985), using 
citation and citation depreciation measures, suggests a life cycle model.  His theory and 
                                                 
2 In a related paper, Christensen, Szmer and Wemlinger (2009) find that that diversity of race and gender on 
appellate panels correlates with delay. 
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data suggest that judges tend to improve as they age up to a certain point and then, 
presumably as age catches up, decline in performance.  Taha (2004) finds that judges 
with higher ABA ratings and more experience publish more opinions.  Choi, Gulati and 
E. Posner (2010), find that federal district judges who attended one of the top three law 
schools publish more opinions.  In a study of the Japanese judiciary, Ramseyer (2010) 
finds that judges who attended elite law schools and performed well on an exam decided 
medical malpractice cases more quickly and in greater quantity.  Together, these findings 
suggest judges with greater talent and experience—albeit up to the point when old age 
sets in—score better on measures of judicial performance.  We also see that having 
attended an elite educational institution is frequently used as a predictor of future 
performance.     
There is some related work on specialization.  Multiple commentators have 
argued that higher levels of specialization might be beneficial for judging in the more 
technical areas such as intellectual property, tax, bankruptcy and antitrust (Dreyfuss 
1989; Dreyfuss 1995; Stempel 1995; Baum 2009, surveys the literature).  Using data on 
reversal rates in tax cases, Worthy (1971), suggests that specialists (tax judges versus 
regular district judges) do better.  Nash and Pardo (2008) compare the rates of reversals 
and citation rates in bankruptcy cases for district judges and bankruptcy appellate panels.  
Again, the specialists do better.  Scholars examining patent cases find that the Federal 
Circuit reverses district court decisions at a relatively high rate, as compared to the other 
appeals courts, suggesting that the generalist trial judges do not do well in tackling cases 
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in this area (Moore 2001; Chu 2001; Wagner 2004).3  The one study examining the 
relative performances of generalist judges as a function of expertise is Baye and Wright 
(2009).  Baye and Wright look at reversal rates in federal antitrust cases as a function of 
whether the judges attended an economics training course for judges.  Judges with the 
training have higher affirmance rates in antitrust cases.4   A related debate concerns the 
dominance of Delaware in the field of corporate law.  Some scholars argue that the 
dominance of Delaware in corporate law is a function of the high quality of judges on 
that court, particularly in terms of the strong business law backgrounds that they bring to 
the courts and the fact that they regularly see and decide important business law cases 
(Romano 1985).  Securities law, and particularly, securities class action law, is a 
technical area of judging. We would expect based on the foregoing therefore, that prior 
experience in dealing with complex business disputes or transactions, would translate into 
better securities judging.   
Using data from a series of experiments on judges, Guthrie, Rachlinski and 
Wistrich (2006; 2009) ask whether specialist judges (bankruptcy and administrative law 
judges) are more likely to use deliberative processing of information or intuitive 
processing.  The latter type of processing, while having some advantages, can result in 
faulty reasoning overall.  Overall, the authors did not find strong differences in the 
information processing methods used (intuitive processing dominated).            
                                                 
3 Yu (2007) uses reversal rates to compare the performance of specialist and generalist trial courts on 
economic matters in the period prior to the establishment of the Federal Circuit.  He finds that the specialist 
courts are reversed less. 
4 Moore (2001), however, finds no difference in reversal rates between Federal Circuit judges with 
technical backgrounds and those without. 
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To summarize, there is some evidence that innate ability and expertise influence 
the quality of the judicial product.  But the overall picture from the bits and pieces in the 
various studies is murky.  
 
3. Hypotheses 
We hypothesize that higher-ability judges will produce better judicial output.  The 
challenge lies in measuring ability, on the one hand, and output, on the other hand. 
 
3.1 Measures of Judicial Ability 
We look at nine measures of judicial ability.  Our first three measures look to past 
performance as a judge.  These measures are Publications Per Filing (number of 
published opinions in 2001 and 2002 divided by number of filings in the district court in 
which the judge sits), Positive Citations (the average number of positive citations per 
opinion, from courts outside the circuit, for the judge for opinions published in 2001 and 
2002), and the Affirmance Rate (the number of affirmances of published opinions, 
including non-overruled, non-appealed decisions, divided by the number of published 
opinions).   We assume that judges who publish more, produce opinions that receive 
more positive citations, and have a higher affirmance rate are judges with higher ability.5  
The data we use to assess prior performance come from cases decided in 2001-2002, 
prior to the securities class action motions data that are used for the dependent variable 
(2003-2007).  They also reflect all cases decided, not just securities class actions. 
We also look at what we call native talent and experience ability measures. We 
tabulate general judicial experience, including the number of years on the bench (Judicial 
                                                 
5 The citations for these opinions were measured up to January 1, 2007. 
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Experience) and whether the judge was a judge prior to joining the federal bench (Prior 
Judge).  General judicial experience may translate into better judicial decisionmaking in 
securities motion decisions in a way not captured solely through an assessment of past 
productivity and opinion quality.  We tabulate business-law related experience, including 
whether the judge was in private practice immediately before becoming a district judge 
(Prior Private Practice) and the fraction of business-law related cases the judge decided 
from 2001 to 2002 (Business Caseload).  The specialized ability of a judge to handle 
complex business-law related issues may be important for how well the judge performs in 
motion decisions during a securities class action.  Private practice typically involves 
corporate law or litigation, often securities litigation; for that reason, we predict that 
judges with such experience will have higher ability for securities cases.  Similarly, 
judges who already have a lot of business cases will have higher ability for securities 
cases.  We also look at whether the judge graduated from Harvard, Yale, or Stanford Law 
School, one of the top three law schools (Top Law School), as our measure of native 
talent.6  
We lastly look at whether judicial ability depreciates with age.  For our proxy for 
how age may affect a specific judge, we focus on whether the judge chooses senior status 
(Senior). A senior judge may prefer to work less, reflecting less ability or energy. 
Our past performance, native talent and experience, and depreciating ability 
categories give us in total nine measures of judicial ability: (1) Publications Per Filing; 
                                                 
6 We initially limit ourselves to using only the top three law schools because the rankings at the very top 
have tended to be very stable over the years.  Since almost all of the judges in our study graduated well 
before there were any U.S. News rankings, we had to use a more recent ranking.  Based on the stability of 
the rankings at the top end, we assume that this stability extended further back in time, over the different 
years when the judges in our study graduated.    
12	
	
(2) Positive Citations; (3) Affirmance Rate; (4) Top Law School; (5) Judicial Experience, 
(6) Prior Judge; (7) Prior Private Practice; (8) Business Caseload; and (9) Senior. 
   
3.2. Measures of Judicial Output 
We use five measures of judge performance that exploit our dataset of securities 
class action motions. 
Taking on a Securities Case.  Securities class actions are frequently difficult, 
involving multiple sophisticated parties, numerous lawyers, and difficult issues of 
causation, materiality and scienter.  Not only is the regulatory apparatus complicated, but 
so are the underlying theories of market behavior.  To add to the judge’s woes, there is 
considerable confusion about the precise standards coming out of the most recent statute 
dealing with these cases, the PSLRA.  We predict that judges with high general ability or 
high specialized ability will be able to handle these cases more easily, and thus will be 
more likely to take on these cases in the first place.   
A caveat here is that judges do not formally have the power to choose whether to 
hear certain cases.  In theory, cases get assigned to judges in a random fashion.  The only 
exception is for senior judges who, as one of the benefits of seniority, get greater control 
over their dockets.  In addition, when judges take senior status, they are able to discard 
portions of their docket; the discarded cases are then assigned to the other active judges.7 
This measure, therefore, has the most salience for our subset of senior judges. 
However, it is possible that the measure might also be relevant for active judges 
because judges have several informal instruments for controlling their docket.  First, 
                                                 
7 E.g., Rule 17 of the Local Rules (noting that “ [w]hen an active judge becomes a senior judge, or later as 
the judge chooses, the judge may keep as much of his or her existing docket as said judge desires and 
furnish the assignment committee with a list of all cases which the judge desires to have transferred.”).  
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judges have some discretion over whether to recuse themselves from cases for reasons of 
perceived conflicts of interest.  These recusals could be on the grounds of either 
ownership of stock, past work for one of the parties or ties to someone who has an 
interest in the company at issue.8  Second, most securities class actions are the product of 
multiple cases with an overlap in parties, claims, and factual background.  The process of 
consolidating cases and choosing which judge to hear the consolidated case may allow 
for some discretion over assignment.  Third, some courts, by local rule or custom, permit 
the chief judge to assign cases non-randomly.9  If a big securities class action case comes 
in, the chief judge may assign the case to a judge with special expertise in these cases.10   
Fourth, some courts may have procedures for funneling “related” cases to the same judge, 
in the interest of efficiency.  These procedures might allow the judges room to assign 
                                                 
8 The rules on recusal are fairly vague (a “substantial interest” test), giving judges discretion in their 
decisions regarding whether to recuse themselves (28 U.S.C. Sections 144 and 455 are the relevant statutes; 
Ingram 2009, discusses the current debate).  The question for our purposes though is what recusal signals 
about the judge in question.  We have seen from recent nominations to the Supreme Court that the recusal 
decisions of nominees are scrutinized carefully by opponents of the nominee (at least three recent 
nominees, Alito, Breyer and Thomas, have been accused of acting improperly with respect to failures to 
recuse themselves).  Promotion-seeking and risk-averse judges might, therefore, be more likely to recuse 
themselves.  In addition, judges might also use recusal to avoid tough cases or ones where they might be 
criticized.  Concern about such behavior, we suspect, resulted in a line of cases on the “duty to sit”.  Laird 
v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 837 (1972).  However, on the other side of the equation, there is the obligation to 
avoid the appearance of impropriety. 
9 The website answering basic questions regarding the federal courts, explains: 
At times judges having special expertise can be assigned cases by type, such as complex criminal 
cases, asbestos-related cases, or prisoner cases. The benefit of this system is that it takes advantage 
of the expertise developed by judges in certain areas. Sometimes cases may be assigned based on 
geographical considerations. For example, in a large geographical area it may be best to assign a 
case to a judge located at the site where the case was filed. 
See Answer to Question: How are judges assigned to cases (available at http://www.uscourts.gov/faq.html). 
The chief judge, we assume, will likely send cases toward those judges with an expertise in the 
area.  In theory, it is possible that the chief judge might also use her administrative power strategically, to 
shape the direction of legal developments (a famous example is Justice Burger’s assignment of the opinion 
in Roe v. Wade to Justice Blackmun).  Wahlbeck (2006).  We suspect, however, that such dynamics do not 
exist on the district courts since the power to the chief judge to assign cases is minimal there.   
10 For a broader discussion of these informal mechanisms of specialization on the federal trial courts, see 
Baum (2010, chapter 1).  Specialization by subject area also appears to occur on the federal appeals courts.  
Cheng (2009).  
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certain types of cases to the specialists among them.11  Fifth, judges may have some 
leeway in deciding which cases to remove from their dockets and transfer to judges 
newly appointed to the court.12  The new judge will typically be assigned a set of cases 
from the assignment sheets for the other judges.  Even assuming that the assignment 
procedure is random (e.g., every fourth case gets assigned to the freshman judge), the 
other judges may, depending on local practice, have room to say that they would like to 
hold on to particular cases.13 In sum, although judges are not supposed to have discretion 
over which cases they hear, some discretion might exist nevertheless.14    
Rejection of the Lead Plaintiffs’ Selection of Lead Counsel. In a securities class 
action, a court-appointed lead plaintiff acts on behalf of the rest of the investor class 
members.  The PSLRA creates a presumption that the plaintiff with the greatest financial 
stake in the litigation (typically the party with the greatest damages), among other 
criteria, will be appointed lead plaintiff.15  Congress intended the PSLRA’s lead plaintiff 
provision to put in place a motivated lead plaintiff to protect the interests of investor class 
members against possible agency problems with the plaintiffs’ attorneys.   
At the stage in a securities class action when the lead plaintiff is selected, judges 
make two decisions.  First, the judge decides on the motion for lead plaintiff.  Second, the 
judge decides on the lead plaintiffs’ motion for lead counsel (often co-lead counsel).  We 
                                                 
11 For example, see the rules of the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, districts that see a high 
volume of securities cases.  Rules 1.5 & 1.6, Local Rules of the Southern and Eastern District of New York 
(1997; With Amendments through 2009) (hereinafter “Local Rules”).    
12 E.g., Rule 12 of the Local Rules (explaining the system of assigning cases to new judges by lot, but also 
noting that “[n]o case shall be transferred without the consent of the transferor judge”).  
13 This possibility was suggested to us by a former federal district judge. 
14 For a period of time prior to that covered by our dataset, chief judges on the district court had the 
authority to reassign complex cases to particular judges (this was the 1971 Bar Harbor Resolution).  This 
resolution, however, was rescinded in 1999 on the grounds that it allowed undue specialization and was 
inconsistent with “judicial autonomy”.  Cheng (2007) (citing Committee on Court Administration and Case 
Management, Judicial Conference of the United States, Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial 
Conference of the United States, March 16, 1999, available http://jnet.ao.dcn/library/99-mar.html). 
15 See Section 21D, Securities Exchange Act of 1934.   
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do not focus on the first decision on the lead plaintiff itself because, in many cases, the 
judge does not have a decision to make.   Where there is only one movant for lead 
plaintiff, the judge will select the sole movant.  Even if multiple motions are made for 
lead plaintiff, as Choi (2011) reports, movants will often voluntarily withdraw their 
motions leaving just one movant (or combine together to form one grouped motion for 
lead plaintiff).  We focus instead on the second judicial decision to approve the lead 
plaintiffs’ selection of lead counsel—a decision a judge will have to make in all cases 
after the selection of the lead plaintiffs. 
In practice, plaintiffs’ attorneys come tied to a specific lead plaintiff movant at the 
lead plaintiff selection stage.  Once the court appoints a specific movant for the lead, in 
theory the movant is allowed to select any plaintiffs’ attorney of their choice.  However, 
courts often appoint the plaintiffs’ attorney who initially filed the motion for lead plaintiff 
as the lead counsel (Choi 2011).  If multiple movants are appointed together as a group of 
lead plaintiffs, courts will often appoint the individual attorneys for each movant as co-
lead counsel without regard to the need for multiple attorney firms on the same case 
(Choi 2011).  In effect, judges often appear to rubber stamp the selection of lead counsel 
by the lead plaintiff despite the specter of attorney agency cost problems.  The reason for 
this may be that it is easier for the judge to do what the lawyers in front of the judge ask 
for (typically with no party opposing the lead plaintiff’s selection of lead counsel); going 
out of the way to act as an advocate for the absent investor is likely to annoy the lawyers 
and delay the resolution of the litigation.16    
Accordingly, we predict that higher-ability judges will be more likely to reject the 
                                                 
16 The fact that some district judges got reversed on their refusal to approve the lead plaintiffs’ selection of 
lead counsel may have added to the district judges’ general reluctance to second-guess the proposed lead 
counsel motion.  See, e.g., In re Mexico State Inv. Council, 250 Fed. Appx. 225 (2007).     
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lead plaintiff’s selection of attorney.   
Dismissal with Prejudice.   Defendants move for dismissal of the case.  Denials of 
such motions cannot be appealed because they are not final orders, but grants of the 
motion can be appealed.  In addition, because the grant of the motion ends the case at an 
early stage and under a rigorous set of conditions (the judge is ruling that, assuming all 
the properly alleged facts to be true, the plaintiffs still lose), judges are generally 
expected to explain their reasons. 
The opinion for judges who grant a motion to dismiss takes on special 
significance in a securities class action.  Because the determination of the motion to 
dismiss in a securities class action is arguably the most important decision in the 
litigation (securities class actions almost never go to trial), the lawyers and higher courts 
pay special attention to how the law is developing in this area.  Plaintiffs’ lawyers, who 
are often repeat players, have an incentive to appeal if they think the law is moving in a 
direction adverse to them.  Unsurprisingly then much of the securities law involving Rule 
10b-5 has been generated through motion to dismiss decisions as well as appellate and 
Supreme Court opinions reviewing the motion to dismiss decision.17  Finally, when cases 
are not dismissed, the parties are likely to settle (as opposed to going to trial), which is 
                                                 
17 To assess the importance of the motion to dismiss and the opinion written by the district judge supporting 
the motion to dismiss decision, we canvassed the U.S. Supreme Court cases that dealt with Rule 10b-5 of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the most common cause of action in securities class actions.  We 
determined what underlying district court decision led (ultimately after the Circuit Court opinion) the 
Supreme Court to grant certiorari and write an opinion that generated new law on Rule 10b-5 by the 
Supreme Court.  Of the eight opinions we found that were written after 2000, seven of them involved a 
district court that granted a motion to dismiss. The other decision involved a denial by the district court of 
class certification.  The eight Supreme Court decisions dealing with Rule 10b-5 from 2005 to 2011 (with 
the district court's decision) were: Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 547 U.S. 71 (2006) 
(dismissal); Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 554 U.S. 336 (2005) (dismissal); Tellabs v Makor Issues 
& Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007) (dismissal); Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific Atlanta, 
Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008) (dismissal); Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S.Ct. 286 (2010) 
(dismissal); Merck & Co., Inv. v. Reynolds, 130 S.Ct. 1784 (2010) (dismissal); Matrixx Initatives, Inc., v. 
Siracusano, 131 S.Ct. 1309 (2011); Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., __ U.S. __ (2011) (class 
certification); Janus Capital Group v. First Derivative Traders, __ U.S. __ (2011) (dismissal). 
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less work for the judge.  For these reasons, granting a motion to dismiss entails more 
work and greater risk for the trial judge.  We therefore predict that higher-ability judges, 
with a particular interest in affecting Rule 10b-5 doctrine, will grant more motions to 
dismiss, all other things being equal (including in particular the strength of the case). 
Rejection of Attorneys’ Fees.  The greatest point of conflict between plaintiffs’ 
attorneys and the plaintiff class is the attorney fee award. With passive members of a 
plaintiff class, plaintiffs’ attorneys may use their control to request a greater attorney fee. 
The greater the award, the lower is the recovery available from the settlement fund.  
Meanwhile, the managers representing the corporate defendant have an incentive to 
collude with plaintiff’s lawyers in order to make the case go away.  We therefore 
conjecture that higher-ability judges will be more likely to reject the lead counsel’s 
attorney fee motion.   
Of all our measures, this one is the most vulnerable to endogeneity problems, in 
that lawyers will likely have a sense, ahead of time, of the degree to which a particular 
judge is more or less likely to accept unreasonable fee requests.   
  
 3.3 Summary 
 We predict that high-ability judges are likely to produce higher-quality output.  
We test among several different possible measures of general ability, including past 
performance measures primarily used in the academic literature to assess judges 
(productivity and citations) as well as native talent and general judicial experience that 
are more commonly discussed in press accounts.  It is useful to divide these measures 
into law application and case management.  Judges who are skilled at law application, 
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and more broadly the development of the law, write lots of published opinions, are 
frequently cited, and possibly frequently affirmed (though not if their ambitions outstrip 
their abilities).  Judge who are skilled at case management have more practical 
experience as lawyer and judge.  One might predict that judges skilled at law application 
will be more likely to grant motions to dismiss (because of their intellectual self-
confidence and interest in securities law), and judges skilled at case management more 
likely to deny motions for lead plaintiff and for attorneys’ fees (because of their 
experience in the day-to-day management of a trial).  We also test the importance of 
specialized ability, as measured by private practice experience and number of business 
cases tackled in the past.  High-quality output means willingness to take the more 
difficult path in securities class actions—accepting a case, rejecting the lead plaintiff, 
dismissing the case, and rejecting proposed attorneys’ fees.  We also test the importance 
of the possibility of depreciating ability through our examination of the relationship 
between output and senior status. 
 
4. Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
4.1. Sample 
To test our hypotheses, we use two samples: a securities class action case dataset 
and a judge dataset.  Our securities data consists of class actions involving a Rule 10b-5 
cause of action filed from 2003 to mid-2007 used in Choi (2011) and Choi and Pritchard 
(2012), which were obtained from the Stanford Securities Clearinghouse.18  We exclude 
                                                 
18 Choi and Pritchard (2012) add to the dataset in Choi (2011) and cover class actions filed from January 1, 
2003 to June 21, 2007 for use in their test of the Supreme Court Tellabs decision that was announced on 
June 21, 2007. 
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cases in which financial firms (SIC 6000 to 6999) are the primary defendant because of 
the different regulatory regime that applies to them.   
[Insert Table 1 About Here]. 
 Table 1 shows that the lawsuit filings were distributed relatively equally across 
our sample period except for 2006 where there is a decline in class action filings.  
Relatively few of our class actions were filed in 2007 due to the ending point of the 
dataset on June 21, 2007.  Looking at the frequency of lawsuit by circuit, we find that 
most class action filings are in the Second and Ninth Circuits with 18.7% and 26.1% of 
the lawsuits.  Almost half (49.9%) of the class actions resulted in settlement.  A large 
percentage (37.5%) resulted in dismissal with prejudice. 
Our judge dataset consists of all federal district court judges active in either 2001 
or 2002.  We selected the judge dataset time period to allow us to collect information on 
the judge’s judicial output prior to class action filings in our securities class action 
dataset.  As reported in Table 1, we had a total of 615 judges.19  Of these 615 judges 




We use two sets of independent variables in our regression tests.  The first set of 
independent variables are past performance (Publications Per Filing, Positive Citations 
and Affirmance Rate), native talent (Top School), general judicial experience (Judicial 
Experience and Prior Judge), specialized business experience (Prior Private Practice and 
                                                 
19 Some judges were excluded because they were active for only portions of the period.  Also excluded 
were a handful of judges where there appeared to be errors in the data (for example, where Westlaw had 
conflated the cases for two judges with the same last name). 
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Business Caseload), and depreciating ability (Senior) measures of ability for district court 
judges.20 
Some of our judicial ability measures do not vary during our study time period, 
such as Top School, Prior Judge, and Prior Private Practice.  For measures of prior 
judicial output and experience, including Publications Per Filing, Positive Citations, and 
Business Caseload, we assess the measures for each district court judge for the 2001 to 
2002 time period prior to our dataset of securities class action pre-trial motion outcomes 
that ranges from 2003 to mid-2007.  For variables that can change over our study period 
from 2003 to mid-2007, including Senior and Judicial Experience, we define the variable 
based on our specific test.  For our tests of whether a judge presides at least once over a 
securities class action decision and the total number of securities-related reversals in our 
class action sample period, we define Senior2005 as equal to 1 if the judge is a senior 
judge in 2005 or earlier and 0 otherwise.  We choose 2005 as the mid-point in our class 
action dataset that ranges from 2003 to mid-2007.  We similarly define Judge 
Experience2002 as the difference between 2002 and the year the judge was appointed to 
the district court.  For our tests of individual class action decisions, we define Senior as 
equal to 1 if the judge is a senior judge in the year of the specific motion decision in 
question (e.g., a decision to appoint lead counsel) and 0 otherwise.  We also define Judge 
Experience as the difference between the year of the specific decision in question and the 
year the judge was appointed to the district court. 
                                                 
20 Three of our measures of primary judicial ability, Publications Per Filing, Affirmance Rate and Positive 
Citations, are subject to an endogeneity problem.  A judge who incurs effort in order to publish opinions, 
write highly cited opinions, or write the kinds of opinions that won’t be reversed, may have less time to 
tackle difficult motions in securities litigation.  However, we assume that these variables are independent 
for two reasons.  The three independent variables come from an earlier time period (2001-2002), and refer 
to the mass of cases that judges hear, not just the securities cases.  Thus, they are more plausibly a measure 
of overall judicial ability. 
21	
	
 Beyond our measures of judicial ability, we include two other judicial 
characteristic variables as controls rather than measures of judicial ability. We define an 
indicator variable for whether the judge was appointed by a Democratic President 
(Democrat).  We do not assume that Democrats are more or less competent than other 
judges, but one might predict that Democrats would be more favorable to plaintiffs’ 
lawyers, who are traditional supporters of the Democratic party, and to lead plaintiffs, 
who are likely to be ordinary people cast as victims of corporate greed.  We also define 
an indicator variable for whether the judge was a chief judge at any point during the 2003 
to 2007 time period (Chief Judge2003-2007).  For our tests of individual class action 
decisions, instead of Chief Judge2002-2007 we use Chief Judge, defined as 1 if the judge 
is the Chief Judge in the year of the specific motion decision in question and 0 otherwise.  
The additional administrative burdens of a chief judge may reduce their likelihood of 
presiding over a securities class action and decrease the willingness of the chief judge to 
exert effort.  Table 2 displays summary statistics. 
[Insert Table 2 About Here]. 
The second set of independent variables focus on a number of securities class 
action level characteristics (collectively referred to as “Case Controls”).  From the 
complaints, we collect information about the causes of action alleged and use indicator 
variables for the cause of action.21  In addition to Rule 10b-5, Section 11 claims were 
alleged in 11.5 percent of the cases (Section 11).  Section 11 is available only for material 
misstatements and certain omissions in the registration statement used in a public 
offering, but it allows for a substantially greater chance of surviving the motion to 
                                                 
21 For each class action, we collected data from the last filed consolidated class complaint.  When a 
consolidated complaint was not available, we collected data from the last filed complaint on file with the 
Stanford Securities Class Clearinghouse. 
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dismiss because Section 11 does not require plaintiffs to plead fraudulent intent.  
Moreover, loss causation and due diligence are affirmative defenses. 
 We collect information on key aspects of the litigation from the last amended 
complaint available for each class action.22  The presence of the information in the 
complaint indicates that the plaintiffs found the information useful in meeting the 
pleading standards.  We include in our Case Controls indicator variables for SEC and 
other government investigations (Govt. Investigation) and accounting restatements 
(Restatement) as described in the complaints, each a high profile adverse event and the 
most common events triggering these suits.  The presence of a government investigation 
or a restatement indicates a higher likelihood of wrongdoing and thus a stronger case for 
the plaintiffs.  The overall strength of the case will also be bolstered if the firm has 
terminated a top officer including the Chief Executive Officer, Chief Operating Officer, 
and Chief Financial Officer (Officer Term.) or its auditor (Auditor Term.) due to events 
relating to the fraud in question as described in the complaints.   We also include whether 
the complaint alleges insider trading (Insider Trading Claim), another indicator of 
whether the corporate managers were misbehaving. 
Next, we use variables in our Case Controls relating to the firm-specific 
characteristics of the defendant issuer. We use a measure of firm size, measured as 
market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year preceding the beginning of the class 
period (Market Capitalization).  Larger firms may have greater resources to defend 
against a class action.  On the other hand, larger firms may also be better able to pay a 
settlement, leading to more vigorous prosecution of the case by plaintiffs’ attorneys.  We 
                                                 
22 As described in Choi (2011), the complaints and other securities docket related documents were collected 
from the PACER online website. 
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also include one industry control that may relate to case strength.  Firms in the high 
technology sector (High Tech) may have stock prices that are particularly vulnerable to 
declines in sales or earnings. 
Summary statistics on the dependent variables used in our empirical tests are also 
reported in Table 2.  Table 3 reports the correlation among our nine judicial quality 
measures.  As reported in Table 3, the nine judicial quality measures are not highly 
correlated.  Senior judges are positively correlated with Judge Experience (correlation 
coefficient = 0.353).  Publications Per Filing are positively correlated with Top School 
(correlation coefficient = 0.146). 
[Insert Table 3 About Here]. 
5. Empirical Tests 
5.1. Judge Assignment to Securities Class Actions 
To assess whether judges use the limited discretion available to them to specialize 
in (or avoid) securities class actions, we focus on whether a district judge in our judge 
dataset acted as a judge in at least one securities class action during our case dataset time 
period (from 2003 to mid-2007).  We use an indicator variable, Securities Judge, defined 
as equal to 1 if the judge made a lead plaintiff decision in a securities class action during 
our case dataset time period and 0 otherwise. We selected the lead plaintiff decision 
because this decision is typically among the first decisions a judge will make in a 
securities class action.  If a judge decides to recuse herself, this decision will typically 
occur prior to the lead plaintiff motion decision.  Similarly, consolidation of multiple 
cases occurs before the lead plaintiff decision; any judge who seeks to avoid continuing 
with a case by not remaining the judge over a consolidated action will do so prior to the 
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lead plaintiff decision.  As noted earlier, our caveat with this measure is that judges are 
not supposed to have discretion over whether they take on cases in particular subject 
areas.  The exception is the case of senior judges, who do have substantially more 
discretion over their docket.   
To control for various factors that may affect the assignment of a district court 
judge to a securities class action, we estimate a multivariate logit model with Securities 
Judge as the dependent variable estimated on judge-level data.  For independent 
variables, we include our measures for past judicial performance (Publications Per 
Filings, Positive Citations, and Affirmance Rate).  
Whether a judge is assigned to preside over a securities class action will turn on 
the prevalence of securities class actions in the particular district court in which the judge 
sits.  To control for this possibility, we include indicator variables for those district courts 
with 20 or more class actions in our dataset.23  Lastly, not all our judges active in 2001 
and 2002 remained active throughout the 2003 to mid-2007 time period of our class 
action dataset.  Some judges resigned, were elevated to a higher court, or died.  Judges 
who were active for only part of the class action time period will be less likely to have 
presided over a securities class action.  We include a series of indicator variables (Active 
Service Indicators) for those judges active—including senior judges presiding over 
cases—for only four of the five years, three of the five years, and so on with judges 
active throughout 2003 to 2007 as the base category. 
                                                 
23 These include the Southern District of New York, the Central District of California, the District of 
Massachusetts, the District of New Jersey, the Middle District of Florida, the Northern District of 





Securities Judgei  = α  + ß1iPublications Per Filingi   
+  ß2iPositive Citationsi   +  ß3iAffirmance Ratei    
+  District Court Indicators  
+  Active Service Indicators  +  εi 
 
We present the results in Table 4 as Model 1.  We do not find evidence that any of 
our measures of past judicial performance, Positive Citations, Affirmance Rate, or 
Publications Per Filing, is associated with a higher propensity to preside over a securities 
class action.   
We next move to the native talent and experience-based measures of ability.  We 
re-estimate Model 1 with the addition of our native talent measure (Top School), our 
general judicial experience measures (Prior Judge and Judge Experience2002), and our 
depreciating judicial ability measure (Senior2005).  We also include our other judge 
characteristic control variables (Chief Judge2002-2007 and Democrat).  Model 2 of Table 
4 reports the results.  Consistent with the expectation that senior judges have the greatest 
control over their dockets, we find evidence that senior or close-to-senior-status judges 
are less willing to preside over securities class actions.  The coefficient on Senior 2005 is 
negative and significant at the 5% level. 
Prior judicial experience also shows up as a significant explanatory variable.  The 
coefficient on Prior Judge is positive and significant at the 1% level and the coefficient 
on Judge Experience2002 is positive and significant at the 10% level.  Those judges with 
prior judicial experience are more likely to preside over a securities class action.  
However, this finding has to be taken with a grain of salt, given that judges may not have 
much control over their dockets.    
[Table 4 About Here] 
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 We next focus on whether judges with prior business law experience are more 
likely to preside over securities class actions—in other words whether district court 
judges informally specialize in taking class action cases.  We re-estimate Model 2 with 
the addition of our specific business experience measures (Prior Private Practice and 
Business Caseload).  Due to the high negative correlation between Prior Judge and Prior 
Private Practice, leading to the possibility of multicollinearity, we exclude our general 
judicial experience variables (Prior Judge and Judge Experience2002). We report the 
results as Model 3 in Table 4.  Neither Business Caseload nor Prior Private Practice is 
significantly different from zero. We find no evidence that judges with business law 
experience have a greater likelihood of presiding over a securities class action.  As in 
Model 2, the coefficient on Senior2005 is negative but now significant at the 10% level.  
Judges who are senior or about to become senior judges are less likely to preside over 
class actions.24   
In sum, we find relatively little evidence of the importance of any of the ability 
measures in determining whether a judge presides over securities class actions.  Our 
measures of judicial ability based on past judicial performance are not related to the 
decision of a judge to preside over a securities class action.  Judges with greater prior 
business caseload are no more likely to preside over a securities class action than other 
                                                 
24 As a robustness test, we combine Prior Judge, Judge Experience2002, Business Caseload, and Prior 
Private Practice together with our other independent variables in the same model.  Unreported, we obtain 
similar qualitative results as in the models of Table 4 with one difference.  
 To gauge the intensity of judge participation with securities class actions, we replace the binary 
Securities Judge dependent variable in the models of Table 4 with the number of class action suits from 
2003 to mid-2007 over which a particular judge presided (measured as of the time of the lead plaintiff 
decision).  Unreported, we find similar qualitative results with the following differences.  The coefficient 
on Chief Judge2002-2007 is negative and now significant at the 5% level in Model 2.  This supports the 
view that Chief Judges, perhaps because of their increased administrative burden, are less likely to preside 
over securities class actions.  The coefficient on Senior2005 in Model 3, while still negative, is now 
significant at only the 11.1% level. 
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judges, although judges with greater general judicial experience are more likely to 
preside over such actions.25  As noted, it is likely that what we are observing is that active 
judges have relatively little discretion in deciding whether to take on a securities case.  
By contrast, senior judges, who clearly to have more discretion to select cases, are less 
likely to take on securities class actions, and, even when they do begin them, are more 
likely to drop them.   
      
5.2. Approval of Lead Plaintiff Attorney Selection 
We predict that higher-ability judges will be more likely to reject the lead 
plaintiff’s selection of lead counsel than are lower-ability judges.  To test this hypothesis, 
we construct an indicator variable, Lead Plaintiff Attorney Rejected, defined as equal to 1 
if the judge rejected the lead plaintiffs’ choice of lead counsel without modification and 0 
                                                 
25 Our tests above compare judges who presided over securities class actions with judges who did not 
preside over such class actions.  As another test of what factors determine whether federal district court 
judges choose to preside over securities class actions, we examine whether the first judge listed on the 
docket for a federal securities class action is the same judge who eventually makes the lead plaintiff motion 
decision.  We predict that lower-ability judges are more likely to drop out of securities class actions.   We 
construct an indicator variable, Judge Continues, equal to 1 if the first judge listed in the docket of the 
reference complaint listed in Stanford’s Securities Class Action Clearinghouse database (the consolidated 
complaint in the case of multiple filings) is the same judge that makes the lead plaintiff motion decision 
and 0 if the two are the different.  We estimate three multivariate logit models using Judge Continues as the 
dependent variable on case level data using case level versions of the independent variables of the three 
models of Table 4 as well as the same case controls as in Table 5.  The models exclude cases where the 
reference complaint case shifted to another court before the lead plaintiff motion decision.  The models also 
exclude cases where the first judge no longer was actively presiding over cases (due to death for example) 
by the time of the lead plaintiff motion decision.   
Unreported, we obtain similar results as the three models in Table 4.  We find evidence that senior 
judges are less willing to preside over securities class actions.  The coefficient on Senior is negative and 
significant at the 5% and 1% levels in Models 2 and 3 respectively.   This is consistent with our hypothesis 
that lower-ability judges– as we assume is correlated with senior status – are more likely to drop out as 
judge of a securities class action. We find that the coefficient on Business Caseload is positive and 
significant at the 10% level in Model 3.  This supports the hypothesis that judges with a greater prior 
business caseload are more likely to retain jurisdiction over a securities class action.  Unlike the models of 
Table 4, the coefficients on Prior Judge and Judge Experience are not significantly different from zero.   
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otherwise.26  We estimate a multivariate logit model using Lead Plaintiff Attorney 
Rejected as the dependent variable on case level data.   
For our independent variables, we include our measures of judicial past 
performance (Publications Per Filing, Positive Citations, and Affirmance Rate).  We also 
include the Case Control variables and Circuit fixed effects in the model.  Errors are 
clustered by district judge. 
 
Lead Plaintiff Attorney Rejectedi = α  + ß1iPublications Per Filingi   
+  ß2iPositive Citationsi   +  ß3iAffirmance Ratei  
+  Case Controls  +  Circuit Effects  +  εi 
 
 
We present the results in Table 5 as Model 1.  The coefficients on Publications 
Per Filing, Positive Citations, and Affirmance Rate are all not significantly different from 
zero.  None of our conventional measures of judicial quality correlate with the decision 
by a judge to reject the lead plaintiffs' selection of lead counsel.   
We next examine the native talent measures, experience-related measures of 
judicial and business ability, and depreciating ability measure.  We re-estimate Model 1 
with the addition of Top School, Prior Judge, Judge Experience, and Senior as well as our 
other judge characteristic control variables (Chief Judge and Democrat).  Senior, Judge 
Experience, and Chief Judge are all measured as of the year of the lead plaintiff attorney 
selection judicial decision.  The results are in Table 5 (Model 2).  As in Model 1, the 
coefficients on Publications Per Filing, Positive Citations, and Affirmance Rate are 
insignificant.  Contrary to our hypothesis that taking senior status was a sign of 
diminishing ability, senior judges appear more likely to reject the lead plaintiffs’ choice 
                                                 
26 Note that this variable is different from the Securities Judge variable, which was 1 if the judge made any 
type of decision regarding the plaintiff’s choice of lead counsel (both approval and rejection). 
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of lead counsel.  The coefficient on Senior is positive and significant at the 5% level.  
Measured at the mean of all the independent variables, the presence of a Senior judge 
correlates with a 30.5 percentage point increase in the probability that the lead plaintiff 
motion for lead counsel will get rejected.  Not all Senior judges are the same.  Those 
Senior judges who, despite their greater ability to avoid securities class actions, decide to 
preside over such a class action may differ from other Senior judges.  These presiding 
Senior judges may have greater inclination and expertise to handle securities law related 
matters, leading to the positive correlation between Senior judge status and a greater 
willingness to reject the lead plaintiffs’ choice of attorney.  Model 2 also reports that, 
consistent with our hypothesis, the coefficient on Judge Experience is positive and 
significant at the 10% level.  Measured at the mean of all the independent variables, an 
additional 10 years of judicial experience correlates with a 2.6 percentage point increase 
in the probability that the lead plaintiff motion for lead counsel will get rejected.  The 
other variables (aside from the Democrat variable, which turns out not to be statistically 
significant in Model 3) are not statistically significant.   
[Table 5 About Here] 
In Model 3 of Table 5 we include our business-specific measures for experience 
(Business Caseload and Prior Private Practice) and remove our general judicial 
experience variables (Prior Judge and Judge Experience).  In Model 3, the coefficients on 
Publications Per Filing, Positive Citations, and Affirmance Rate are again insignificant.  
Judges that score well on conventional measures of judicial quality are not more likely to 
reject the lead plaintiffs’ selection of lead counsel without modification, consistent with 
our hypothesis.  The coefficient on Business Caseload is positive and significant at the 
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10% level.  Measured at the mean of all the independent variables, an additional 10 
percentage points of business caseload correlates with a 1.6 percentage point increase in 
the probability that the lead plaintiff motion for lead counsel will get rejected.  Judges 
with greater business expertise are also more likely to reject the lead plaintiffs’ selection 
of lead counsel without modification.  As in Model 2, the coefficient on Senior in Model 
2 is positive and significant (now at the 1% level), suggesting a willingness to exert high 
scrutiny on the part of the senior judges.  Measured at the mean of all the independent 
variables, the presence of a Senior judge correlates with a 38.4 percentage point increase 
in the probability that the lead plaintiff motion for lead counsel will get rejected.   
To check the robustness of the results in Table 5, we combined Prior Judge, Judge 
Experience2002, Business Caseload, and Prior Private Practice together with our other 
independent variables in the same model.27 We expanded the definition of Top School to 
include not only Harvard, Yale, and Stanford but also Columbia, U. Chicago, U. 
Michigan, and UC Berkeley.28  We also added independent variables on the type of lead 
plaintiff to the models of Table 5.29  The robustness tests returned similar qualitative 
                                                 
27 Unreported, we obtain similar qualitative results as in the models of Table 5 with the following 
differences. The coefficient on Prior Judge is positive and significant at the 10.1% level and the coefficient 
on Judge Experience is positive and significant at the 5% level.  The coefficient on Business Caseload is 
positive and significant at the 5% level and the coefficient on Prior Private Practice is positive and 
significant at the 10% level. 
28 These seven law schools were the top 7 law schools in the 1987 U.S. News and World Report ranking 
and termed "Top School7".  As noted earlier, we began by using only the top three law schools, as 
measured by U.S. News, because the rankings of the top three schools have tended to be highly stable (and 
therefore probably translated back in time in the same fashion).  In expanding the list of schools, we 
followed the same criterion.  The top seven is the next most stable category at the top end of the rankings 
(below the top seven, there is a considerable amount of shifting in the rankings for schools, relative to that 
for the very top schools).  We re-estimated the models of Table 5 replacing Top School with Top School7.  
Unreported, the coefficients on Top School7 were not significantly different from zero and we obtained the 
same qualitative results as in Table 5 with the following differences.  In Model 2, the coefficient on Judge 
Experience is positive and significant at the 5% level; the coefficient on Democrat is positive and 
significant at only the 10% level. 
29 We added to the models of Table 5 variables for the fraction of the lead plaintiff group that consisted of a 
public pension fund (Public Pension), labor union pension fund (Labor Union), and other institutional 
investor (Other Institution) to control for the importance of the lead plaintiff identity in determining 
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results as in Table 5.30 
Endogeneity is a potential issue with our examination of the judicial decision 
whether to accept the lead plaintiffs’ selection of lead counsel.  Prospective plaintiffs’ 
lawyers might anticipate a judge’s ability and adjust their actions at the stage in a class 
action when the lead counsel firms are selected.  Where the judge has lower ability, 
prospective plaintiffs’ attorneys may put forth an application for lead counsel that is less 
likely to benefit the class and more likely to benefit solely the plaintiffs’ attorneys.  One 
can imagine, for example, plaintiffs’ attorneys agreeing to divide up class actions, 
directing lower quality attorneys to low quality judges (who will be more likely to accept 
such attorneys) and leaving higher quality attorneys for the high quality judges.  
Plaintiffs’ attorneys may also aggregate previously separate motions for lead plaintiffs 
and join together as co-lead counsel to eliminate the risk of not getting selected as lead 
counsel and to diversify the risk of not achieving a profitable settlement from the 
litigation (Choi (2011)). 
The possibility of endogeneity in the motion for lead counsel will bias against 
finding a correlation between judges with high ability characteristics and a higher 
likelihood of rejecting the lead counsel motion.  If lawyers perfectly anticipate judges’ 
ability, then lead counsel motions should never be rejected.  Our results—which 
demonstrate a correlation between certain judge characteristics and the rejection of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
whether a judge approves the lead plaintiffs' selection of lead counsel.  Judges may be more receptive to the 
lead counsel choice of an institutional lead plaintiff compared with an individual lead plaintiff.   
Unreported, none of the coefficients on Public Pension, Labor Union, and Other Institution in the three 
models of Table 5 are significantly different from zero.  We obtained similar qualitative results as in Table 
5 with the following exceptions.  The coefficient on Judge Experience in Model 2 is positive and now 
significant at the 5% level.  The coefficient on Business Caseload in Model 3 is positive but now significant 
at only the 11%, just beyond conventional significance levels. 
30 We examine whether the judge quality variables we identify as significant in the models in Table 5 are 
significant when interacted with Judge Democrat. Unreported, none of the interaction terms in the three 
models of Table 5 are significant. 
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lead counsel motion—are thus of even greater significance.  We also are unsure of the 
magnitude of the possible endogeneity.  As noted at the outset, we shaped our inquiry to 
cover a period of time when the law on securities class actions was in considerable flux, 
which should have made predictions about what judges would do more difficult from the 
perspective of plaintiffs’ attorneys.  To assess the impact of endogeneity, we need a 
proxy for the “quality” of the lead counsel motion.  For our proxy, we use the number of 
lead plaintiffs in the lead plaintiff group.  A large number of lead plaintiffs—with a 
correspondingly larger collective action problem among the lead plaintiffs—indicates a 
greater likelihood that the plaintiffs’ attorneys have de facto control and that the judge 
should pay greater attention to the motion for lead counsel.  Plaintiffs’ attorneys, for 
example, who know the judge will not in fact engage in close scrutiny of the lead counsel 
motion will be more likely to combine with other plaintiffs’ attorneys (or alternatively, 
find more lead plaintiffs on their own) to generate both a large group of proposed lead 
plaintiffs and co-lead counsel. 
We first compared the number of lead plaintiffs using a series of t-tests for our 
judge characteristics independent variables—separating the lead plaintiff judges into two 
groups based on the binary variables (such as Senior) and the continuous variables (such 
as Publications Per Filing) divided at the median.  Not one of our t-tests resulted in a 
significant difference, suggesting that endogeneity is not a large concern for our lead 
counsel selection test.  We next re-estimated the models in Table 5 using an ordered logit 
model with the number of lead plaintiffs as the dependent variable.  Unreported, we 
found that the coefficient on Senior was positive and significant at the 10% level, 
indicating that plaintiffs’ attorneys may attempt to take advantage of senior judges by 
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forming larger groups of lead plaintiffs (often with a correspondingly larger number of 
co-lead counsel in the lead counsel application).  As discussed above, senior judges, 
nonetheless, are more likely to reject such applications compared with other judges.  In 
other words, it is as if plaintiffs' attorneys under-estimate the level of scrutiny and 
attention senior judges are likely to apply.  We also found that the coefficient on Prior 
Private Practice is negative and significant at the 10% level, indicating that plaintiffs’ 
attorneys may worry about judges with Prior Private Practice and adjust to form smaller 
groups of lead plaintiffs with a correspondingly smaller number of co-lead counsel in the 
lead counsel application.  The fact that Prior Private Practice was not significantly 
different from zero in Table 5, therefore, could be a result of this adjustment on the part 
of plaintiffs’ attorney to present such judges with less troublesome applications for lead 
counsel firms. 
In sum, our tests on the lead plaintiffs’ selection of lead counsel provide limited 
evidence that higher-ability judges are more willing to scrutinize lead counsel proposals.  
In particular, judges with greater business law experience and general judicial experience 
are more likely to dismiss lead counsel motions.  While we do not find evidence that 
judges with prior private practice experience are more likely to dismiss lead counsel 
motions, we do find evidence that plaintiffs’ attorneys may adjust their behaviour to 
present such judges less problematic applications for lead counsel.  Senior judges, 
contrary to expectation, do not appear to shirk on effort.  It may be that senior judges of 
low ability responsibly avoid securities cases (or those cases are not assigned to them), 
leaving those cases to the subset of senior judges with high ability, who are willing to 
retain those cases.  It also may be that senior judges, while preferring to avoid securities 
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class action cases, work hard on them once they have them (although we do find some 
evidence that plaintiffs’ attorneys may present senior judges with more troublesome 
applications for lead counsel). 
 
5.3. Dismissal Decision 
We predict that higher-ability judges will be more likely to dismiss a securities 
class action.  To test this hypothesis, we construct an indicator variable, Dismissal, 
defined as equal to 1 if the judge granted a dismissal with prejudice and 0 otherwise.  We 
control for various factors that may affect a judge’s decision to approve the lead 
plaintiffs’ choice of lead counsel with a multivariate logit model using Dismissal as the 
dependent variable estimated on case level data.   We omit those cases where the 
plaintiffs’ voluntarily dismissed their suit from the model. 
As independent variables, we include our measures of judicial past performance 
(Publications Per Filing, Positive Citations, and Affirmance Rate).  We also include the 
case controls described above to control for the strength of the securities class action.  
Because the law of the specific circuit may affect the likelihood of dismissal, we include 
circuit effects in the model.  We include year effects (for the year of the dismissal 
decision) to control for shifts in the law governing how courts deal with dismissals over 
the time period of our class action dataset from 2003 to mid-2007.  Errors are clustered 
by district judge. 
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Dismissali  =  α  + ß1iPublications Per Filingi   
+  ß2iPositive Citationsi  +  ß3iAffirmance Ratei   
+  Case Controls  +  Circuit Effects    
+  Year Effects  +  εi 
 
 
We present the results in Table 6 as Model 1.  The coefficient on Publications Per 
Filing is positive and significant at the 10% level.  More productive judges are more 
likely to grant a motion to dismiss.  Our other measure of past performance, Positive 
Citations, is also significant at the 5% level.  Judges that write higher quality opinions are 
also more likely to grant a motion to dismiss.   
[Table 6 About Here] 
We next focus on our native talent measure, experience-related measures of 
judicial and business ability, and depreciating ability measure.  We re-estimate Model 1 
with the addition of Top School, Prior Judge, Judge Experience, and Senior as well as our 
other judge characteristic control variables (Chief Judge and Democrat) and report the 
results in Model 2 of Table 6.  In Model 3 of Table 6 we include our business-specific 
measures for experience (Business Caseload and Prior Private Practice) and remove our 
general judicial experience variables (Prior Judge and Judge Experience).  In all three 
models of Table 6, two of our past performance measures of judicial ability (Publications 
Per Filing and Positive Citations) are significant.  In Model 1, one standard deviation 
increase in a judge's Publications Per Filing correlates with an increase of 8.2 percentage 
points in the probability that the judge will grant the motion to dismiss.  Similarly, in 
Model 1, one standard deviation increase in a judge's Positive Citations correlates with an 
increase of 9.6 percentage points in the probability that the judge will grant the motion to 
dismiss.  Higher ability judges are more likely to dismiss a case.  In contrast with our past 
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performance measures, none of our innate or experience-related measures of judicial and 
business ability are significant in either Models 2 or 3. 
To check the robustness of the results in Table 6, we combined Prior Judge, Judge 
Experience2002, Business Caseload, and Prior Private Practice together with our other 
independent variables in the same model.31 We also expanded the definition of Top 
School to include not only Harvard, Yale, and Stanford but also Columbia, U. Chicago, 
U. Michigan, and UC Berkeley.32  Both robustness tests returned similar qualitative 
results as in Table 6. 
The decision to grant or reject a motion to dismiss is the most important of the 
decisions that we discuss.  Unlike the other decisions, the decision on the motion to 
dismiss will require a usually lengthy opinion applying securities law (rather than generic 
procedural law), and an opinion granting that motion will be scrutinized by a court of 
appeals.  Thus, one might expect judges who are skilled in law application to deny such 
motions more frequently than judges who are skilled in case management.  Our results 
provide some support for this theory.33 
                                                 
31 Unreported, we obtained the same qualitative results as the models in Table 6.   The coefficient on 
Publications Per Filing remains positive and significant at the 10% level; the coefficient on Positive 
Citations remains positive and significant at the 5% level. 
32 These seven law schools were the top 7 law schools in the 1987 U.S. News and World Report ranking 
and termed "Top School7".  We re-estimated the models of Table 5 replacing Top School with Top 
School7.  Unreported, the coefficients on Top School7 were not significantly different from zero and we 
obtained the same qualitative results as in Table 6. 
33 Endogeneity is a potential issue with the dismissal decision because plaintiffs’ attorneys might rationally 
anticipate a judge’s ability (and resulting inclination to focus on the motion to dismiss) and choose to 
voluntarily dismiss their case prior to a judicial dismissal decision.  Because we only test the decision to 
dismiss on cases that were not voluntarily dismissed, we may understate the impact of a judge’s ability on 
the overall rate at which cases are dismissed (whether voluntarily or due to a dismissal with prejudice).  To 
determine the importance of voluntary dismissal, we define Any_Dismissal as equal to 1 if the judge 
granted a dismissal with prejudice or the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the suit and 0 otherwise.  We re-
estimated the models in Table 6 using Any_Dismissal as the dependent variable.  Unreported, we obtained 
the same qualitative results as in Table 6.  We thus find that higher-ability judges correlates with an 
increased probability of dismissal—whether the judge makes the actual dismissal decision or the plaintiffs’ 




5.4. Approval of Settlements and Attorney Fees 
The judge plays a key role in evaluating the two-sided agency problem in 
securities cases at multiple points; one of which is when the parties bring the judge a 
settlement agreement for approval.  The role of the judge here is to act as the guardian for 
the absent investors and ensure that their agents (the plaintiff’s lawyers and the corporate 
executives) are not misbehaving.  We take the willingness to reject settlement agreements 
as a sign of judicial ability.  Rejection means more work for the judge.   
We first categorize judicial decisions on motions to accept the first preliminary 
settlement motion.  As reported in Table 7, only 8 out of the 247 cases (or 3.2%) with 
judicial decisions on the first preliminary settlement motion resulted in a denial of the 
motion.  We then examined judicial decisions on the final settlement motion. 
As noted earlier, this measure is particularly susceptible to endogeneity problems, 
in that lawyers probably get familiar with the degree of scrutiny that a judge will apply to 
their settlement requests.  And, unlike with some of other measures we have used, where 
the endogeneity problem was arguably ameliorated somewhat by the fact that the topics 
at issue were new (relating to the PSLRA), a judge’s behavior vis-à-vis settlements 
requests is likely consistent across a range of subject areas.   
Consistent with the foregoing, we find no variation in the data.  None of the 
decisions we examined had a denial of the motion for settlement.  Accordingly, rather 
than look at judicial decisions concerning the settlement, we examine whether any 
change takes place to the settlement amount from the date of the initial stipulated 
settlement agreement to the date of the final settlement motion decision.  Only 8 out of 
38	
	
215 settlements (or 3.7%) had a change in the settlement amount from the initial 
stipulated settlement agreement.  Moreover, only 2 of the 215 settlements (or 0.9%) 
resulted in an increase in the settlement amount to the benefit of class members. 
[Table 7 About Here] 
Because of the small number of denials of the preliminary or final settlement 
motion as well as the small number of times the settlement amount actually increased to 
the benefit of class members from the initial stipulated agreement, we are unable to 
estimate a multivariate model to test our hypotheses on district judge characteristics.  
Judges almost always—regardless of their characteristics—accept the settlement 
proposed by the securities class action litigants. 
 In an attempt to get at the question from a different direction, we looked at the 
decision by judges to approve the requested fees for the plaintiffs’ attorneys.  The point 
of greatest interest to one set of potentially misbehaving agents, the plaintiffs’ lawyers, is 
the approval of attorney fees.  Higher-ability judges will be more likely to scrutinize 
these attorney fees because they cannot depend on the defense side to do so fully (after 
all, they are paying the fees out of the corporate coffers rather than the pockets of the 
executives).  To test this, we focus on the sub-sample of class actions that resulted in a 
settlement.  We define an indicator variable Judge Rejected Fee as equal to 1 if the judge 
rejected the attorney fee motion without modification and 0 otherwise.  To control for 
various factors that may affect the judicial decision on attorney fees, we estimate a 
multivariate logit model on the set of settlements in our dataset with Judge Approved Fee 
as the dependent variable.  We note, however, that the attorney fee approval decision is 
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also susceptible to the endogeneity problems similar as with the settlement request 
decision.   
For our independent variables, we include our measures of judicial past 
performance (Publications Per Filing, Affirmance Rate, and Positive Citations).   We also 
include the requested attorney fee (Requested Fee).  The chance that a judge will approve 
the attorney fee in a securities settlement will decrease as the level of requested fee 
increases.  We also include the log of the settlement amount (ln(Settlement Amount)).  
Judges may be more willing to accept the attorney fee request the greater is the settlement 
amount. We include Circuit effects in the model to control for circuit-specific doctrine 
and practices that may affect a judge’s propensity to accept the plaintiffs’ attorney fee 
request.   We have no reason to believe that the propensity of a judge to accept or reject 
the fee request varied with time and do not include year effects.  Errors are clustered by 
district judge. 
 
Judge Rejected Attorney Feei  =  α  +  ß1iPublications Per Filingi   
+  ß2iPositive Citationsi   +  ß3iAffirmance Ratei   
+  ß4iRequested Feei   +  ß5iln(Settlement Amount)i    
+  Case Controls  +  Circuit Effects  +  εi 
 
 
We present the results in Table 8 as Model 1.  The coefficient on Publications Per 
Filing is negative and significant at the 1% level.   Measured at the mean of all the 
independent variables, one standard deviation increase in a judge's Publications Per 
Filing correlates with a decrease of 20.4 percentage points in the probability that the 
judge will reject the plaintiffs' attorney fee request.  Contrary to our hypothesis, past 
productivity is correlated with lower willingness of a judge to reject an attorney fee 
application after a settlement takes place.  Our other past performance measures, Positive 
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Citations and Affirmance Rate, are not significantly different from zero.   
Next come our native talent measure, general judicial experience-related 
measures, and depreciating ability measure.  We re-estimate Model 1 with the addition of 
Top School, Prior Judge, Judge Experience, and Senior as well as our other judge 
characteristic control variables (Chief Judge and Democrat) and report the results in 
Table 8 as Model 2.  Note that in Model 2, the coefficients on Publications Per Filing, 
Positive Citations, and Affirmance rate are all negative and significant (at the 10%, 1%, 
and 5% levels respectively), contrary to our hypothesis that past performance will 
correlate with superior judicial decisionmaking.  Also contrary to our ability hypothesis, 
the coefficients on Prior Judge and Judge Experience are both negative and significant at 
the 1% and 5% levels respectively.  Measured at the mean of all the independent 
variables, Prior Judge correlates with a decrease of 27.1 percentage points in the 
probability that the judge will reject the plaintiffs' attorney fee request.  Similarly, a one 
standard deviation increase in Judge Experience correlates with a decrease of 6.7 
percentage points in the probability that the judge will reject the plaintiffs' attorney fee 
request.  Top School—attending, Harvard, Yale or Stanford for law school—is also 
negative and significant the 1% level.  Measured at the mean of all the independent 
variables, Top School correlates with a decrease of 10.5 percentage points in the 
probability that the judge will reject the plaintiffs' attorney fee request.  Judges who 
attended a top law school are less likely to reject the attorney fee request without 
modification.   
The coefficient on Democrat in Model 2 is negative and significant at the 1% 
level.  Measured at the mean of all the independent variables, Democrat correlates with a 
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decrease of 70.9 percentage points in the probability that the judge will reject the 
plaintiffs' attorney fee request.  The drop in the probability of rejecting the attorney fee 
request is large in magnitude for Democrat judges.  Democrat judges in particular appear 
reluctant to take actions that directly reduce the flow of money to plaintiffs' attorneys. 
The Senior variable was dropped from Model 2 because Senior judges were 
perfectly correlated with judges approving the attorney fee motion.  On its face, this 
finding might suggest that senior judges exert lower effort and thus are more likely to 
accept the attorney fee request.  However, litigants likely have greater familiarity with the 
preferences of senior judges and may adjust their fee awards to match these preferences. 
 [Table 8 About Here] 
In Model 3 of Table 8 we include our business-specific measures for experience 
(Business Caseload and Prior Private Practice) and remove our general judicial 
experience variables (Prior Judge and Judge Experience).  Similar to Model 2, the 
coefficients on Publications Per Filing, Positive Citations, and Affirmance Rate are again 
negative and significant.   As with Model 2, the coefficients on Top School and Democrat 
are also negative and significant.  Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that the 
coefficients on Business Caseload and Prior Private Practice are positive and significant 
at the 5% level in Model 3.  Measured at the mean of all the independent variables, one 
standard deviation increase in a Business Caseload correlates with an increase of 5.9 
percentage points in the probability that the judge will reject the plaintiffs' attorney fee 
request.  Similarly, Prior Private Practice correlates with an increase of 22.7 percentage 
points in the probability that the judge will reject the plaintiffs' attorney fee request. 
Judges with greater experience with business cases as well as prior private practice 
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experience are more likely to reject the attorney fee request.34  
To check the robustness of the results in Table 8, we combined Prior Judge, Judge 
Experience2002, Business Caseload, and Prior Private Practice together with our other 
independent variables in the same model.35 We also expanded the definition of Top 
School to include not only Harvard, Yale, and Stanford but also Columbia, U. Chicago, 
U. Michigan, and UC Berkeley.36  Both robustness tests returned significantly weaker 
results than in Table 8.  We also control for possible selection bias from focusing solely 
on settled cases and obtained similar qualitative results as in Table 8.37 
                                                 
34 To test the impact of the judicial quality variables for Democrat judges, we added interaction terms 
between those judicial quality variables that were significant in Models 2 and 3 of Table 8 and the 
Democrat indicator variable.  Due to collinearity problems, we added interaction terms between Democrat 
and Publications Per Filing, Positive Citations, and Affirmance Rate separately from interactions terms 
between Democrat and Prior Judge and Judge Experience in Model 2.  The interaction term between 
Democrat and Top School was dropped also due to collinearity problems.  Unreported, none of the 
interaction terms were significantly different from zero.   We similarly added interaction terms between 
Democrat and those judicial quality variables that were significant in Model 3.  None of these interaction 
terms were significant. 
35 Unreported, the results are somewhat different from those in Table 8.  The coefficient on Publications 
Per Filing is no longer significantly different from zero.  The coefficients on Positive Citations and 
Affirmance rate remain negative and significant (at the 10% and 5% levels respectively).  The coefficients 
on Prior Judge, Judge Experience, Business Caseload, and Prior Private Practice are no longer significantly 
different from zero--possibly due to collinearity among these variables (and in particular the negative 
correlation between Prior Judge and Prior Private Practice).  The coefficient on Top School remains 
negative and significant (now at the 5% level). 
36 These seven law schools were the top 7 law schools in the 1987 U.S. News and World Report ranking 
and termed "Top School7".  We re-estimated the models of Table 8 replacing Top School with Top 
School7.  Unreported, the coefficients on Top School7 were not significantly different from zero.  In 
addition, the coefficients on Business Caseload and Prior Private Practice while positive are no longer 
significantly different from zero.  The other results are qualitatively the same as those in Table 8. 
37 Observable data exists on the number of attorney hours only where settlement occurs. The decision to 
settle, however, is not random.   To control for this selection bias, we attempted to re-estimate the models 
of Table 8 with the HECKPROB model in Stata. For an instrument, we used the total number of securities 
class actions filed in the dataset time period for the district court in which the specific class action is filed.  
We assume this variable is correlated with the decision to settle. A particular district court with large 
numbers of securities class action may face greater pressure to dismiss such actions to clear their docket, 
leading to fewer settlements.  On the other hand, we assume this variable is not correlated directly with 
requested attorney fees in a particular settled litigation.  Unfortunately, the HECKPROB models did not 
converge to a solution for any of the models of Table 8.  To obtain convergence, in Model 1, we omitted 
the circuit fixed effects and the case control variables except for the Officer Terminated, Insider Trading, 
and log of market capitalization.  The re-estimated Model 1 using HECKPROB returned qualitatively the 
same results as in Table 8.    To obtain convergence, in Model 2, we omitted Publications Per Filings, 
Positive Citations, Affirmance Rate, the circuit fixed effects, and the case control variables except for the 
Officer Terminated, Insider Trading, and log of market capitalization.  The re-estimated Model 2 using 
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In sum, the relationship between our measures of judicial ability and the decision 
to reject attorney fees stand in contrast to our results for the lead plaintiff counsel and 
motion to dismiss decisions.  Unlike for the two earlier decisions, our past performance 
measures of judicial ability are largely insignificant as explanatory variables.  Our other, 
non-business specific measures of ability are significant but in the wrong direction.  We 
suspect that the inconsistency of the results on this measure is largely a function of the 
endogeneity problem.  Lawyers develop familiarity with the individual propensities of the 
different district judges and adjust their fee requests appropriately.  The especially high 
rate of success that lawyers have with requests submitted to senior judges and chief 




 The existing literature on judges focuses largely on cases where there are 
published opinions.  That poses a particular problem with regards to the district courts 
because the primary task of these judges is to manage cases—ruling on evidentiary 
matters, discovery requests, and preliminary motions—rather than publish opinions (Kim 
et al. 2009).  The recent electronic availability of information on decisions on the various 
intermediate decisions in a case, however, has made a fuller and more fine-grained 
inquiry into the behavior of district judges possible (Hoffman et al.2008; Kim et al. 
                                                                                                                                                 
HECKPROB returned the same qualitative result for Top School, Prior Judge, Judge Experience, and 
Democrat as in Table 8.  To obtain convergence, in Model 3, we omitted Publications Per Filings, Positive 
Citations, Affirmance Rate, the circuit fixed effects, and the case control variables except for the Officer 
Terminated, Insider Trading, and log of market capitalization.  The re-estimated Model 2 using 
HECKPROB returned the same qualitative result for Top School, Business Caseload, and Democrat as in 
Table 8.  The coefficient on Prior Private Practice is positive but significant at only the 15.8% level, beyond 
conventional significance.   
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2009).  Using this data, we inquire into the behavior of district judges in securities class 
actions, an area where the judge has a particularly important role to play in policing the 
two-sided agency problem. 
 Below we set out a table that summarizes how our nine measures of judicial 
ability translated into the four measures of judicial performance (with “Y” indicating that 
the ability measure in question correlates with superior judicial performance and “N” 
indicating inferior judicial performance). 
 Decision to 













Per Filings  
0 0 Y N 
High Positive 
Citations 
0 0 Y N 
High Affirmance 
Rate 
0 0 0 N 
Attended Top 
Law School 
0 0 0 N 
Judicial 
Experience 
Y Y 0 N 
Prior Judge  
 
Y 0 0 N 
Prior Private 
Practice  
0 0 0 Y 
Business 
Caseload 
0 Y 0 Y 
Senior Status 
 
N Y 0 * 
*Dropped from the regression 
 One particular aspect of the summary table stands out.  Certain categories of 
ability measures do better in predicting high quality performance than others.  Two of the 
past performance measures (citations and publications) do well in predicting whether a 
judge will grant a motion to dismiss.  The other seven measures, by contrast, do not do 
well at all on this score.  This is perhaps because granting a motion to dismiss typically 
requires the judge to provided a written explanation of his decision and subjects the judge 
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to a meaningful risk of reversal.  Those judges (law appliers) who have a greater ability 
to write opinions and explain their reasons are perhaps more willing to take on the task of 
granting a motion to dismiss.  Also, given that the decision on the motion to dismiss tends 
to be highly legalistic, it is probably those judges who have greater skill in dealing with 
doctrine who do better at this task.  The subset of judges who score higher on numbers of 
citations and publications probably fit within this category.   
It is interesting to note that it is a different subset of judges who do well on the 
other measures, which arguably require more in the way of experience and judgment 
rather than legal skills.  These are the case managers.  Take the two measures that involve 
having to second-guess motives – that is, to recognize an agency problem.  These two 
measures are the ones that look at the judge’s willingness to question the selection of the 
lead plaintiff in the class and to question the attorney fee request.  Here, it is the judges 
who have prior experience (in private practice, with business cases, and in judging) who 
are more likely to perceive problems.  Senior judges also appear to have a greater ability 
to discern agency problems.   
As for the ability indicator that is probably the first one that anyone notices when 
considering a judge’s qualifications for a promotion – whether the judge attended a top 
law school – it predicts nothing.  Similarly, affirmance rates (or their converse, reversals), 
tend to often receive attention when a judge’s performance is being evaluated.  However, 
we found little indication that judges with higher affirmance rates were performing better 
on their decisions on key securities motions.  
Finally, contrary to our predictions, we do not find consistently negative effects 
for a judge taking senior status.  Senior judges are less likely than active judges to preside 
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over a securities class actions, but those who do preside are more willing to reject a lead 
plaintiff motion. 
The question of how to measure judicial performance is an age old one. Over the 
years, numerous measures have been utilized by bar association evaluation committees, 
researchers, politicians, legislatures, and so on.  There has been little inquiry, however, 
into which of these measures actually translates into better judicial performance.  It has 
been taken for granted, for example, that measures such as judicial experience, the type 
of law school one attended, and one’s rate of reversal or affirmance, are important 
indicators of judicial ability.  We find that the question of whether the various ability 
measures will translate into high quality performance on a particular task is a complex 
one. On the tasks we examined, some of the standard measures did not perform at all.  
Other measures performed better or worse on particular tasks.  Finally, some actually 
correlated with negative performance on a task.  Different measures of ability, depending 
on what aspect of ability they are measuring, work to predict different aspects of judicial 
performance.  Judges do a variety of different tasks that require varying sets of skills.  At 
bottom, our findings underscore the risk of using simple ability measures for the purpose 





Bai, Lin, James D. Cox and Randall S. Thomas. 2010. Lying and Getting Caught: An 
Empirical Study of the Effect of Securities Class Action Settlements.  Unpublished Draft.  
 
Barondes, Royce de Rohan. 2009.  ABA Ratings of Federal District Court Judges and 
Likelihood of Shepherd’s Warning Signal, Unpublished Draft (available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1443094).  
 
Baum, Lawrence.  2009. Probing the Effects of Judicial Specialization. Duke Law 
Journal, 58: 1667-__ 
 
Baum, Lawrence. 2010.  Specializing the Courts. 
 
Baye, Michael R. and Joshua Wright. 2009. Is Antitrust too Complicated for Generalist 
Judges? The Impact of Economic Complexity and Judicial Training on Appeals 
(available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1319888). 
 
Bebchuk, Lucian A. 1992. Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on 
State Competition in Corporate Law.  Harvard Law Review 105: 1435-510. 
 
Brenner, Saul and Harold J. Spaeth. 1986. Issue Specialization in Majority Opinion 
Assignment on the Burger Court. Western Politics Quarterly 39: 520-__. 
 
Cheng, Edward K. 2008. The Myth of the Generalist Judge, Stanford Law Review 61: 
519-__. 
 
Christensen, Robert K., and John Szmer.  2009.  Examining the Efficiency of the U.S.  
Court of Appeals:  Pathologies and Prescriptions.  Unpublished Working paper. 
 
Christensen, Robert K., John Szmer and Elizabeth Wemlinger. 2009. Diversity, Conflict 
and Judicial Efficiency in the U.S. Court of Appeals.  Unpublished Working Paper. 
 
Chu, Christian A. 2001. Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit's Claim Construction 
Trends, Berkeley Technology Law Journal. 16: 1075-. 
 
Choi, Stephen J. 2003.  The Evidence on Securities Class Actions.  Vanderbilt Law 
Review, 56:__-__.  
 
Choi, Stephen J., Mitu Gulati and Eric A. Posner.  2010. What Do Federal District Judges 
Want? An Analysis of Publications, Citations, and Reversals.  University of Chicago Law 
School Law & Economics Working Paper. 
 
Choi, Stephen J. 2011.  Motions for Lead Plaintiff in Securities Class Actions.  Journal of 




Choi, Stephen J., and Adam Pritchard. 2012. The Supreme Court's Impact on Securities 
Class Actions: An Empirical Assessment of Tellabs. Forthcoming Journal of Law, 
Economics, and Organization. 
 
Cox, James D., Randall S. Thomas and Lynn Bai. 2008. Do Differences in Pleading 
Standards Cause Forum Shopping in Securities Class Actions?: Doctrinal and Empirical 
Analyses, Working Paper, Vanderbilt University. 
 
Cox, James D., Randall S. Thomas and Lynn Bai. 2006. Does the Plaintiff Matter? An 
Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions. Columbia Law Review, 
106: 1587-__. 
 
Cross, Frank, and Stefanie Lindquist. 2009.  Judging the Judges.  Duke Law Journal 58: 
1383-__. 
 
Dreyfuss, Rochelle Cooper. 1990.  Specialized Adjudication.  Brigham Young University 
Law Review, 1990: 377-__ 
 
Dreyfuss, Rochelle C.  1995. Forums of the Future: The Role of Specialized Courts in 
Resolving Business Disputes. Brooklyn Law Review, 61: 1-__. 
 
Haire, Susan. 2006.  Beyond the Gold Watch: Evaluating the Decision Making of Senior 
Judges on the U.S. Court of Appeals. Unpublished draft (available at 
http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/psrw/haire022406.pdf). 
 
Hoffman, David, Alan Izenman, and Jeffrey Lidicker.  2008. Docketology, District 
Courts and Doctrine.  Washington University Law Review, 85: 681-__  
 
Ingram, David. 2009. Congress Set to Take Aim at Judicial Recusals. National Law 
Journal.  November 02, 2009.   
 
Kim, Pauline, Margo Schlanger, Christina L. Boyd, and Andrew D. Martin. 2009. How 
Should We Study District Court Decision-Making? Journal of Law and Policy, 29: 83-__.  
 
Landes, William M., Lawrence Lessig, and Michael E. Solimine.  1998.  Judicial 
Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges.  Journal of Legal 
Studies, 28: 271-332. 
 
Levi, David and Mitu Gulati. 2009. Judging Measures.  University of Missouri Kansas 
City Law Review _:__-__. 
 
Lott, John.  2005.  The Judicial Confirmation Process: The Difficulty With Being Smart.  




Local Rules of the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York (Effective April 15, 1997; 
With Amendments through December 1, 2009) (available at 
http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/rules/rules.pdf).  
 
Maltzman, Forrest and Paul J. Wahlbeck. 1996. May It Please the Chief? Opinion 
Assignments in the Rehnquist Court. American Journal of Political Science, 40: 421- __ . 
 
Miller, Geoffrey P. 2003. Competing Bids in Class Action Settlements, Hofstra Law 
Review, 31: 633-__. 
 
Moore, Kimberly A. 2001. Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 
Harvard Journal of Law & Technology, 15: 1-__. 
 
Nash, Jonathan and Rafael Pardo.  2008.  An Empirical investigation into Appellate 
Structure and the Perceived Quality of Appellate Review.  Vanderbilt Law Review 61: 
1745-__. 
 
Priest, George L., and Benjamin A. Klein.  1984.  The Selection of Disputes for 
Litigation.  Journal of Legal Studies, 13: 1-55 
 
Posner, Richard A.  1995. Aging and Old Age.  
 
Ramseyer, Mark J. 2010.  Talent Matters: Judicial Productivity and Speed in Japan. 
Unpublished Draft. 
 
Rachlinski, Jeffrey J., Chris Guthrie and Andrew J. Wistrich. 2009.  The “Hidden 
Judiciary”: An Empirical Examination of Executive Branch Justice. Duke Law Journal.  
58: 1477-___ . 
 
Rachlinski, Jeffrey J., Chris Guthrie & Andrew J. Wistrich. 2006. Inside the Bankruptcy 
Judge’s Mind.  Boston University Law Review, 86:1227-__  
 
Romano, Roberta. 1985. Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle. 
Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 1: 225-83. 
 
Romano, Roberta. 1991. The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, Journal 
of Law, Economics & Organization, 7: 55-__. 
 
Stempel, Jeffrey W.  1995. Two Cheers for Specialization, Brooklyn Law Review, 61: 
67--__. 
 
Unah, Isaac.  1998.  The Courts of International Trade: Judicial Specialization, Expertise 
and Bureaucratic Policy Making. 
 
Vining, Richard L., Amy Steigerwalt, and Susan Navarro Smelcher. 2009. Bias and the 
Bar: Evaluating the ABA Ratings of Federal Judicial Nominees.  Unpublished draft 




Wagner, Polk and L. Petherbridge. 2004.  Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An 
Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 
152: 1105-__. 
 
Wahlbeck, Paul J.  2006. Strategy and Constraints on Supreme Court Opinion 
Assignment.  University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 154: 1729___. 
 
Worthy, K. Martin. 1971. The Tax Litigation Structure. Georgia Law Review, 5: 248-__. 
 
Wang, Yu.  2007.  The Impact of Specialized Courts on the Federal Judicial System 
1925-1981: A Study of Federal Circuits’ Decision of Reversal (NYU Politics Working 
Paper #1919) (available on bepress). 
 
Yoon, Albert. 2005. As You Like It: Senior Federal Judges and the Political Economy 





Table 1: Summary of Datasets  
 
Securities Class Action Dataset 
Year of Suit Filing Freq. Percent 
2003 148 26.8 
2004 172 31.2 
2005 138 25.0 
2006 81 14.7 
2007 13 2.4 
Total 552 100.0 
   
Circuit Court Freq. Percent 
1 36 6.5 
2 103 18.7 
3 46 8.3 
4 21 3.8 
5 50 9.1 
6 26 4.7 
7 27 4.9 
8 26 4.7 
9 144 26.1 
10 20 3.6 
11 50 9.1 
D.C. 3 0.5 
Total 552 100.0 
   
Outcome (if Known) Freq. Percent 
Settlement 254 49.9 
Trial Verdict or Judgment  
on Pleadings for Plaintiff 
2 0.4 
Summary Judgment for Defendant 6 1.2 
Voluntary Dismissal 56 11.0 
Dismissal with Prejudice 191 37.5 






Involvement in Securities Class Action Freq. Percent 
Involved in Securities Class Action 201 32.7 
Not involved in Securities Class Action 414 67.3 
Total 615 100.0 
   
Circuit Court Freq. Percent 
1 28 4.6 
2 69 11.2 
3 51 8.3 
4 51 8.3 
5 70 11.4 
6 62 10.1 
7 49 8.0 
8 42 6.8 
9 89 14.5 
10 35 5.7 
11 57 9.3 
D.C. 12 2.0 

















Publications Per Filing 0.025 0.005 0.012 0.026 0.035 
Positive Citations 1.735 0.710 1.333 2.116 1.925 
Affirmance Rate 0.915 0.875 0.949 1.000 0.124 
Top School 0.145 0 0 0 0.352 
Judge Experience2002 10.694 5 10 15 6.782 
Prior Judge 0.423 0 0 1 0.494 
Business Caseload 0.093 0.000 0.056 0.135 0.135 
Prior Private Practice 0.420 0 0 1 0.494 
Democrat 0.524 0 1 1 0.500 
Senior2005 0.224 0 0 0 0.418 











Section 11 Claim 0.115 0 0 0 0.3 
Gov Investigation 0.429 0 0 1 0.5 
Restatement 0.356 0 0 1 0.5 
Officer Terminated 0.326 0 0 1 0.5 
Auditor Terminated 0.074 0 0 0 0.3 
Insider Trading Claim 0.588 0 1 1 0.5 
Market Cap ($ millions) 5781.0 150.2 532.5 1972.8 20204.0 
High Tech 0.167 0 0 0 0.373 
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Requested Fee 0.269 0.250 0.270 0.300 0.052 




Dependent Variables  
 








Securities Judge 0.327 0 0 1 0.469 
 
 








Lead Plaintiff Atty Rejected 0.081 0 0 0 0.273 
Dismissal 0.375 0 0 1 0.485 
Judge Rejected Fee 0.215 0 0 0 0.412 
 
Table 3 























Publications Per Filing 1.000  
Positive Citations -0.086 1.000  
Affirmance Rate 0.064 0.020 1.000  
Top School 0.146 0.028 0.006 1.000  
Senior2005 -0.031 0.052 -0.060 -0.030 1.000  
Prior Judge 0.030 0.006 0.014 -0.085 0.003 1.000 
Judge Experience2002 -0.036 0.037 0.107 -0.022 0.353 -0.104 1.000 
Business Caseload -0.072 -0.024 -0.058 0.021 -0.005 -0.016 -0.095 1.000 
Prior Private Practice -0.043 0.022 0.054 0.073 0.065 -0.702 0.081 -0.074 1.000 
 
Table 4:  Decision to Preside Over Securities Class Actions  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Publications Per Filing 2.117 1.639 1.602 
 (0.68) (0.51) (0.50) 
    
Positive Citations 0.010 0.015 0.015 
 (0.18) (0.28) (0.27) 
    
Affirmance Rate -1.184 -1.625+ -1.304 
 (-1.34) (-1.74) (-1.42) 
    
Top School  0.405 0.366 
  (1.19) (1.09) 
    
Senior 2005  -0.871* -0.605+ 
  (-2.36) (-1.73) 
    
Prior Judge  0.639**  
  (2.80)  
    
Judge Experience2002  0.045+  
  (1.77)  
    
Business Caseload   -0.708 
   (-0.81) 
    
Prior Private Practice   -0.258 
   (-1.10) 
    
Chief Judge2002-2007  -0.326 -0.223 
  (-1.10) (-0.79) 
    
Democrat  -0.176 -0.329 
  (-0.63) (-1.33) 
    
Constant 0.300 0.214 0.853 
 (0.37) (0.24) (0.97) 
District Court Indicators Yes Yes Yes 
Active Service Indicators Yes Yes Yes 
N 404 404 404 
pseudo R2 0.100 0.128 0.112 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Models 1 and 2 are logit models estimated on 
judge-level data with Securities Judge as the dependent variable.  District Court Indicators are for districts 
with 20 or more class actions in our dataset and include the Southern District of New York, the Central 
District of California, the District of Massachusetts, the District of New Jersey, the Middle District of 
Florida, the Northern District of California, the Northern District of Texas, the Southern District of 
California, and the Southern District of Florida.  Variable definitions are in the Appendix.
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Table 5: Lead Plaintiff Attorney Rejected 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 2 
Publications Per Filing 9.094 9.422 13.595 
 (0.99) (1.02) (1.52) 
    
Positive Citations 0.076 0.067 -0.006 
 (0.55) (0.49) (-0.03) 
    
Affirmance Rate -1.368 -0.560 -1.081 
 (-0.51) (-0.20) (-0.30) 
    
Top School  -0.120 -0.486 
  (-0.18) (-0.78) 
    
Senior  2.777* 3.467** 
  (2.52) (3.11) 
    
Prior Judge  0.100  
  (0.19)  
    
Judge Experience  0.080+  
  (1.92)  
    
Business Caseload   6.935+ 
   (1.69) 
    
Prior Private Practice   0.849 
   (1.45) 
    
Chief Judge  0.517 1.445 
  (0.48) (1.30) 
    
Democrat  1.165* 0.628 
  (2.01) (1.03) 
    
Constant -0.628 -5.697* -2.606 
 (-0.24) (-1.97) (-0.67) 
Case Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Circuit Effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 234 234 234 
pseudo R2 0.211 0.274 0.300 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.  Models 1 and 2 are logit models estimated on 
securities class action case level data with Lead Plaintiff Attorney Rejected as the dependent variable 
(rejection of lead plaintiff attorney choice).  Errors are clustered by district judge. Note that Auditor 
Terminated was perfectly correlated with Lead Plaintiff Attorney Choice and was dropped from the logit 
model.  Variable definitions are in the Appendix.  
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Table 6: Dismissal Decision 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Publications Per Filing 8.637+ 10.117+ 10.010+ 
 (1.71) (1.68) (1.72) 
    
Positive Citations 0.245* 0.281* 0.271* 
 (2.03) (2.14) (2.12) 
    
Affirmance Rate -1.492 -1.426 -1.270 
 (-0.91) (-0.85) (-0.74) 
    
Top School  -0.314 -0.345 
  (-0.68) (-0.75) 
    
Senior  -0.570 -0.438 
  (-0.80) (-0.62) 
    
Prior Judge  -0.087  
  (-0.24)  
    
Judge Experience  0.020  
  (0.71)  
    
Business Caseload   -0.923 
   (-0.61) 
    
Prior Private Practice   0.253 
   (0.70) 
    
Chief Judge  -0.239 -0.216 
  (-0.40) (-0.35) 
    
Democrat  0.959 0.835 
  (1.53) (1.52) 
    
Constant 2.286 -0.131 0.081 
 (1.30) (-0.06) (0.04) 
Case Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Circuit Effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 218 218 218 
pseudo R2 0.179 0.198 0.200 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.  Models 1 and 2 are logit models estimated on 
securities class action case level data with Dismissal as the dependent variable.  Errors are clustered by 
district judge.  Note that Auditor Terminated was perfectly correlated with Lead Plaintiff Attorney Choice 
and was dropped from the logit model.  Variable definitions are in the Appendix. 
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Table 7:  Settlement Outcomes 
 
 Freq. Percent 
Judge Accepted Final Settlement Motion 241 100.0 
Judge Rejected Final Settlement Motion 0 0.0 
Total 241 100.0 
   
   
Judge Accepted Preliminary Settlement Motion 239 96.8 
Judge Rejected Preliminary Settlement Motion 8 3.2 
Total 247 100.0 
   
   
Settlement Amount Unchanged From Stipulation 207 96.3 
Settlement Amount Changed From Stipulation 8 3.7 
             Settlement Amount Increased 2 0.9 
             Settlement Amount Decreased 6 2.8 




Table 8: Judge Rejected Attorney Fee 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Publications Per Filing -33.172** -57.260+ -33.793+ 
 (-2.72) (-1.85) (-1.95) 
    
Positive Citations -0.399 -1.557** -1.316** 
 (-1.41) (-3.21) (-2.87) 
    
Affirmance Rate -1.702 -9.908* -6.768* 
 (-0.74) (-2.22) (-2.05) 
    
Top School  -6.118** -5.338** 
  (-3.40) (-3.52) 
    
Prior Judge  -5.504**  
  (-3.06)  
    
Judge Experience  -0.421*  
  (-2.51)  
    
Business Caseload   8.441* 
   (2.30) 
    
Prior Private Practice   2.603* 
   (2.50) 
    
Chief Judge  -2.353 -1.685 
  (-1.37) (-1.16) 
    
Democrat  -7.092** -3.191** 
  (-2.93) (-2.94) 
    
Log odds of the Requested Fee 4.023* 9.707* 6.113* 
 (2.44) (2.53) (2.57) 
    
ln(Settlement Amount) -0.473 -1.626* -1.146 
 (-1.21) (-2.27) (-1.48) 
    
Constant 3.781 26.877** 10.141** 
 (1.27) (2.74) (2.60) 
Case Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Circuit Effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 93 87 87 
pseudo R2 0.254 0.568 0.480 
z statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.  Models 1 and 2 are logit models estimated on 
securities class action case level data with Judge Rejected Attorney Fee as the dependent variable.  Case 
Controls include the Restatement, Gov. Investigation, Officer Terminated, Auditor Terminated, Insider 
Trading, Section 11, ln(Market Capitalization) and High Technology variables. Variable definitions are in 
the Appendix. Errors are clustered by district judge.   
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Securities Judge Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge made a lead plaintiff 
decision in a securities class action during our case dataset time period and 0 
otherwise. 
Lead Plaintiff Atty Rejected Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge rejected the lead plaintiffs’ 
choice of lead counsel without modification and 0 otherwise. 
Dismissal Indicator variable defined equal to 1 if the suit resulted in a dismissal with 
prejudice and 0 otherwise. 
Judge Rejected Fee Indicator variable defined to equal to 1 if the judge rejected the attorney fee 
motion and 0 otherwise. 
Number of Securities 
Reversals 
Number of securities law related decision on which the judge was reversed 




Judge Characteristic Independent Variables 
Variable Description 
Publications Per Filing The average number of published opinions in 2001 and 2002 for the judge in 
question as a fraction of the per judge number of filings for the district court 
in which the judge sits. 
Positive Citations The average number of positive citations per opinion for the judge in question 
during the 2001 to 2002 period. 
Affirmance Rate The number of affirmances of published opinions divided by the number of 
published opinions.  Affirmances include all non-overruled opinions including
non-appealed opinions. 
Top School Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge in question graduated from 
Harvard, Yale, or Stanford Law School and 0 otherwise. 
Senior2005 Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge in question is a senior 
judge in the year 2005 or earlier. 
Senior Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge in question is a senior 
judge in the year in question (first suit filed year, lead plaintiff appointment 
year, or outcome year depending on the test) is made and 0 otherwise. 
Prior Judge Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge in question immediate 
prior provision before appointment was as a magistrate judge or a judge in 
another court system and 0 otherwise. 
Judge Experience2003 Number of years between the year of appointment for the judge in question 
and the year 2003. 
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Judge Experience Number of years between the year of appointment for the judge in question 
and the year in question (first suit filed year, lead plaintiff appointment year, 
or outcome year depending on the test) is made. 
Business Caseload The fraction of the judge in questions published opinions in 2001 and 2002 
that were on a securities law or other federal business law subject matter. 
Prior Private Practice Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge in question immediate 
prior provision before appointment was in private practice and 0 otherwise. 
Democrat Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge in question was appointed 
by a Democrat President and 0 otherwise. 
Chief Judge2003-2007 Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge in question was the chief 
judge for the district at any time during 2003 to 2007 and 0 otherwise. 
Chief Judge Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge in question is the chief 
judge for the district in the year in question (first suit filed year, lead plaintiff 
appointment year, or outcome year depending on the test) is made and 0 
otherwise. 
 
Other Independent Variables 
Case Control Variables Description 
Section 11 Indicator variable equal to 1 if the complaint for a particular class action alleged a 
Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 violation and 0 otherwise. 
Govt. Investigation Indicator variable equal to 1 if the complaint indicated the presence of a SEC or 
other governmental investigation or enforcement action relating to the fraud at 
issue and 0 otherwise. 
Restatement Indicator variable equal to 1 if the complaint indicated that the company 
announced a restatement covering at least part of the class period and 0 otherwise.
Officer Term. Indicator variable equal to 1 if the complaint indicated that a top officer of the 
defendant company resigned or was terminated during the class period and 0 
otherwise. 
Auditor Term. Indicator variable equal to 1 if the complaint indicated that the auditor resigned or 
was terminated during the class period and 0 otherwise. 
Insider Trading Indicator variable equal to 1 if the complaint alleged insider trading and 0 
otherwise. 
Market Capitalization Market value of a company’s common equity (in $ millions) at the end of the 
fiscal year preceding the beginning of the class period. 
Settlement Amount The settlement amount for the class action. 
High Tech Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is in SIC codes 3570-3577 or 7370-7379 
and 0 otherwise 
Public Pension The fraction of lead plaintiffs in a specific case that consist of a public pension 
fund. 
Labor Union The fraction of the lead plaintiffs that consist of a labor union. 
63	
	
Other Institution The fraction of lead plaintiffs in a specific case that are institutions but not public 
pensions or labor unions. 
 
